Z A N D A Q
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زندقه
Binitarianism in shi'ite theology.
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This is exactly what al-Sijistānī writes: It is He [i.e., the Creator] who placed in the first being the form of all things apparent and hidden and established it as Preceding (sābiq) over all end and all beginning [...]. It is He who caused the first being (al-ays al-awwal) to emanate so much light and splendor that no one can know anything beyond it [i.e., beyond the first being]. It is He who, by the extent of His bounty and power, entrusted the governance (tadbir) of both worlds, with all that they contain of subtlety and complexity, to the First Preceding. He established it as Lord of lords (rabb al-arbāb), to whom one turns over the centuries [...]. It is He who made the Forerunner the source of all spiritual and physical light.² This duality of divinity into an uncreated God, the ineffable creator, and a created God, the producer of the universe³, intelligible and revealed, may seem surprising at first glance in an Islamic context. Indeed, among the three so-called "Abrahamic" religions, Islam is distinguished by its rigid and uncompromising monotheism: professing one single God (tawhid) is the very foundation of Islam. Moreover, this one and only God, the only being to bear the name Allah (the God), is omnipotent: He does exactly what He wills, and nothing escapes His control. He is the direct cause of everything that happens in the universe Hence the occasionalism advocated by Sunni Islam, particularly by Ash'arite theology: every phenomenon, every act, whether performed by an animal or a human being, is created by God at the very moment it occurs. There are no secondary causes, nor laws of nature. Philosophers and the few theologians who accept such causes are then considered impious, for they deprive God of His powers and make Him an imperfect being. Such a radical position easily leads to determinism, even fatalism (Leibniz's famous fatum mahumetanum or "Turkish destiny")³, and inevitably raises the problem of theodicy: how to explain imperfections and evil in the world, when everything is created directly and without intermediary by a perfect and just God? Added to this is the thorny question of the nature of this one God. Some Quranic verses advocate the absolute transcendence of Allah, who has nothing in common with his creatures, while other "anthropomorphic" verses describe him as a man, a seated monarch on his throne, who allows himself to be carried away by human feelings such as anger and thirst for revenge or clemency and mercy. Paradoxically, or precisely because of the difficulties raised, Islam's uncompromising monotheism has generated a multitude of schools of thought that appeal to "theophanies." The transcendent God then manifests himself through certain of his creatures, who serve as intermediaries, but whose nature differs widely according to the systems concerned: sometimes they are divine names and attributes, sometimes angels or letters of the alphabet, celestial intellects and souls, prophets and imams. The duality between the Deus absconditus and the Deus revelatus, to use Protestant terminology dear to Henry Corbin, who saw in it the very essence of the "paradox of monotheism,"¹ thus manifests itself in various forms in Islam. 7 Among these is the Ismaili position we encountered in al-Sijistānī: the God of the monotheistic religions, like that of the philosophers, was created by an unknown and ineffable divinity, who delegated (tafwīd) all his powers to his sole creation. In the first part of this article, we will briefly trace the origin of this doctrine in the Shiite circles of Kufa. Then, we will see how it was reformulated in Ismaili Neoplatonism. Finally, we will address the consequences of this duality of divinity for the Ismaili conception of tawhid Our conclusion will be that the image of God, as it emerges from a literal reading of the Quran, is that of Allah, the God of the Muslim religion, while the image of divinity that appears in the "esoteric" (ta'wīl) exegesis of the same Quranic verses is that of the First Intellect, the God of the philosophers. These two aspects of divinity depend on the act of establishment (ibdā) of the transcendent Creator, which thus transcends the binomial zahir and bāțin, "apparent" and "hidden."  Notwithstanding the radical monotheism of Islam, the Quranic verse 43:84, "He is God in heaven and He is God on earth" (wa huwa l-ladhī fi l-samā'i ilāhun wa fi l-ardi ilāhun) seems to have troubled many minds in the turbulent circles of the Shi'ites of Kufa during the 8th century. Thus, a tradition relates to us the audacious reading that the "extremist" (ghālī) Bayān b. Sim'ān (executed in Kufa in 119/737) had given of this verse and its condemnation by the 6th Shi'ite imam Ja'far al-Sadiq (d. 148/765): I said [to Ja'far al-Sadiq]: "Bayan was misinterpreting (yata'awwal) the verse 'He is He Who is God in heaven and He Who is God on earth' (Qur'an 43:84) as if He Who is on earth were different from God in heaven and God in heaven different from God on earth. God in heaven is more magnanimous than God on earth; the inhabitants of earth know the eminence of God in heaven and worship Him." [The Imam] replied: "By God, there is only one God; He has no companion, a god in heaven, nor a god on earth. Bayyan has lied—may God's curse be upon him!"10 According to our sources, Bayān was not alone in supporting such a thesis. Several of his contemporaries did the same, while being more precise about the nature and identity of the God of heaven and the God of earth. The followers of the one called Ma'mar or Mu'ammar, a khattābite (disciple of Abu l-Khattab, d. c. 138/755)11, active in Kūfa during the lifetime of Ja'far al-Şādiq, are said to have declared: Ja'far [al-Sadiq] and Abu l-Khattab are two magnificent angels (malakān 'ažīmān) in the presence of the supreme God (al-ilāh al-a'zam), the God of heaven, while Mu'ammar is the God of earth. He obeys the God of heaven, acknowledging his blessings and power.12 Furthermore, al-Mufaddal b. 'Umar al-Ju'fi, a famous transmitter of hadiths from Ja'far al-Sadiq and also associated with the Khatțābiyya, is accused of having falsely attributed to the Imam, among other heresies, is the distinction between the God of heaven and the God of earth, the latter being none other than the Imam himself. 13. Around this same time, and still in Kufa, the verse in question was invoked by the Tayyariyya, the followers of 'Abd Allah b. Mu'awiya, who led an insurrection against the Umayyads in 127/744: They claim that God is on the throne and that divinity (al-lāhūt) is the Spirit of holiness (rūh al-quds) which transmigrates into the bodies of the imams. They describe the imams and messengers as Christians describe Jesus, the son of Mary [...]. They maintain that the imams are gods, citing as proof the word of God: “God is He who is God in heaven and who is God on earth” (Qur'an 43:84), namely the imam.14 These passages imply that divinity manifests itself in two distinct beings: a heavenly God and an earthly God, subordinate to the former and identified with the prophets and imams. Note the reference to Christianity: “They describe the imams and messengers as Christians describe Jesus, the son of Mary.” Indeed, the same Surah 43, just a little higher up, contains a verse generally considered an anti-Christian polemic, which has nevertheless been given a "Christianizing" and therefore highly audacious reading from an orthodox Muslim perspective: "Say, 'If the Most Merciful had a son, I would be the first to worship him'" (qul in kāna lil-rahmāni waladun fa'anā awwalu l-'ābidīna) (Qur'an 43:81). Nothing is easier than to interpret the conditional as an affirmation (by reading inna instead of in and stretching the syntax a bit) and to deduce from it that Allah does indeed have a son: the first being created by Him, His first creature, identified with the God of the earth in Qur'an 43:84. This step was taken by an ally of Bayān b Sim'an, executed in the same year 119/737 in Kufa: al-Mughīra b. Sa'id, according to whom: [God] created the shadows (zilāl) of men. The first [shadow] He created was Muhammad. According to [al-Mughīra], this is the meaning of the [divine] saying: "Say: If the Most Merciful had a son, I would be the first to worship him" (Qur'an 43:81). Then, He sent Muhammad to all mankind, even though he was only a shadow.¹⁵ Here we are dealing with a doctrine that continually recurs in the esoteric currents of Shi'ism and is supported by countless hadiths attributed to the Imams: the thesis of the pre-existence of the Imams, who were created first, long before the creation of heaven and earth. There are many variations of this doctrine, as the first creature is either Muhammad, or 'Ali, or the five "People of the House" (ahl al-bayt), namely Muhammad, 'Ali, Fatima, al-Hasan, and al-Husayn, or all twelve Imams in the traditions belonging to Twelver Shi'ism.¹ Now, it is precisely this doctrine that constitutes the background of the concept of "delegation" (tafwid) in its most radical form: God delegated his creative powers to his first creature, who thus becomes the demiurge of the sensible world. Al-Ash'ari summarizes this position as follows: The fifteenth faction of the "exaggerators" (ghulāt) maintains that God entrusted (wakkala) and delegated (fawwada) things (al-umur) to Muhammad and gave him power over the creation of the world, so that it is he [Muhammad] who created it and governs it (dabbara), while God Most High created none of it. A great many among them say this about 'Alī111 A similar doctrine is expressed in a hadith attributed to the 6th Imam Ja'far al-Şādiq, transmitted by the Imami theologian Ibn Bābūya (d. 381/991), which reports the words of an "extremist," a disciple of 'Abd Allah b. Saba' 18: He said that God created Muhammad and 'Ali. Then, He delegated to them the thing (or the command, al-amr), so that it is they who create, provide sustenance (razaqā), and cause life and death. 19 Muhammad and 'Ali thus become veritable deities, endowed with the powers and prerogatives that Islam generally grants to Allah, although these powers were delegated to them by a supreme God, who is their Creator. God created his son: an Islamized Arianism? In a previous publication, I showed that the splitting of divinity into a supreme God, whose creative activity is restricted to producing a second God, and this subordinate God, created and creator of the world, is not limited to the extremist Shiite circles of Kufa, since it is shared by Zaydis and Mu'tazilites, admittedly "heterodox," and even by Jews belonging to the Karaite movement. One might be tempted to explain this "dualism" by the influence, quite present in Mesopotamia during the first centuries of Islam, of Iranian religions, such as Zoroastrianism and Manichaeism Indeed, Muslim sources relating to these religions rarely attribute to them a radical dualism advocating the simultaneous existence of two antagonistic ultimate principles. On the contrary, in most presentations, there is only one ultimate God, one and transcendent, who produces, for various reasons, two opposing principles, such as good and evil, or light and darkness.¹¹ However, in the doctrine that is the subject of this article, the ultimate God creates only one being, which represents the pinnacle of perfection in the order of creation, while evil and darkness appear only at a later stage of cosmogenesis, without deriving, in any way, from the supreme God.22 In his work on heresiography, al-Ash'ari establishes a connection between this doctrine, taught by "extremist" Shi'ite groups, and the theses of certain Karaite Christians and Jews: One group among the Ghaliyya [the Shi'ites, considered "extremists"] says that God Almighty gave 'Alī b. Abi Talib the power to create bodies and delegated to him matters and governance. Another group among them says that God gave His Prophet the power to create bodies and to create humankind. This is similar to the doctrine of some Christians who believe that God favored Jesus with a subtlety that enabled him to create the celestial bodies and produce the earthly bodies. This is also similar to the doctrine of those among the Jews who claim that God created an angel and gave him the power to create this world. This angel is the one who created (khalaqa) this world and established (abda'a) it; he is the one who sent the prophets and revealed the books. Such is the doctrine of the followers of Ibn Yāsīn.23 Now, al-Shahrastānī, in his chapter on the Jewish sects, maintains that the Karaites borrowed this image of the creator angel, created by the Supreme God, from Arius.24 He summarizes his doctrine with the slogan: "The Eternal is God and Christ is created (al-qadīm huwa Allāh wa-l-Mașīh huwa makhlūq)."25 At the end of his chapter on the Christians, he returns to Arius, whose Christological position he correctly renders: Arius claims that God is one (Allah wahid), called "Father," and that Christ is the Word of God (kalimat Allāh) and His chosen son ('alā țarīq al-istifa). He was created before the creation of the world and is the creator of all things.26 Christ was created by His Father before the creation of the world; the Father delegated to His Son the power to create the world and rule it as a God. This substitution of Christ for Muhammad or 'Alī had already been professed in Kufa at the end of the Umayyad period by the Shi'ite "extremist" Abū Manşür al-'Ijlī (d. between 120/738 and 126/744). His followers, the Manşūriyya, claimed that "The creature created by God is Jesus, then 'Alī b. Abī Tālib, these two being more eminent than all other created beings >>27. But it is above all "two curious Mu'tazilites," al-Fadl al-Hadathī and Ahmad b. Habit, presented as disciples of al-Nazzām (d. between 221/836 and 230/845), who have entered the history of Muslim theology for having developed this Christology, which is unorthodox from an Islamic point of view.28 Indeed, the pair were excluded from Mu'tazilite circles for having supported the following theses: Christ is the one who created the world, being the Lord of the first and the last. He is the one who will call mankind to account on the Day of Resurrection and who will manifest Himself (al-mutajallī) to them. He is the one to whom the Prophet alludes when he says: “You will see your Lord as you see the moon, without having to strain to see Him.” 29 Among the Mu'tazilites, there are two men who claim that the second lord of creation is a demiurge produced (mudabbir maşnu) subject to annihilation (fanā). These are Fadl al-Hadathī and Ibn Habit. 30 "They claim that the world has two creators, the first of whom is eternal (qadim), namely God Most High, and the other adventitious (hadith): this is the Word of God (kalimat Allāh), Christ, Jesus son of Mary, [the Word] by which the world was created."31 Jesus is therefore a subordinate god created by the eternal God. According to al-Baghdādī, Ibn Habit and Fadl al-Hadathī considered Jesus to be the son of God "in the sense of adoption and not of generation ('alā ma 'nā al-tabannā dūna al-wilāda)."32 God created ex nihilo His first creature and then adopted him as His son All of this is very close to Arianism. However, before we can speak of an Islamized Arianism, we would need to better understand the influence of Arianism on Shi'ism and other Muslim currents, particularly in Kufa and elsewhere in Mesopotamia. In any case, Islam shares with Arianism the rejection of the Incarnation and, consequently, of consubstantiality. Henry Corbin had very clearly foreseen that the various Muslim currents (Shi'ites or Sufis) which appeal to "theophanies" to soften strict monotheism and reconcile the transcendence and immanence of the divinity, avoid at all costs the dogma of the Incarnation and the hypostatic union of the two natures, divine and human, as defined by the councils of what Corbin calls "the official Church."33 Indeed, according to a concept prevalent in various branches of Shi'ism, divinity continually manifests itself on earth in the bodies of prophets and imams. However, their bodies are merely a "veil" (hijāb, satr), a "mold" (qālab), a "shirt" (qamīs), or a "sheath" (ghilāf) in which the divine principle "dwells," without the divine principle being incarnated there, just as we inhabit a house without being physically united to it.34 Since this divine principle transmigrates from one prophet and imam to another, from Adam to the Resurrector of the end times, Corbin recognized in it the Ebionite theme of the Verus Propheta, as it appears particularly in the Pseudo-Clementine literature.135 While it is legitimate to recognize "Judeo-Christian," Ebionite elements in the prophetology and imamology of Shi'ism, the fact remains that Corbin, in his various publications on "the Islam of theophanies," tends to conflate systems that are in fact very different. We have already emphasized that the divine principle meant to manifest the unknown God can take on very diverse forms, names, or divine attributes: Christ, the Universal Intellect, angels, Muhammad, 'Ali, or the Imams. More fundamental, however, is the ontological status of these epiphanies: are they an effusion, an emanation, a reflection of the Ultimate Principle, sharing in the same nature as Him, as is the case with Ibn 'Arabi, al-Suhrawardi, and probably most Twelver Shi'ite mystics? Or is it rather a creature, a principle created ex nihilo by the "Father", who then delegated his Powers to his “Son”? In that case, there is a separation, even a rupture, between the Creator and his creature, who belong to two different natures. This second option has been followed, within Shi'ism, by “extremist” (ghulāt) currents, such as those mentioned in the first part of this article, as well as by the Ismaili branch, which is its direct heir. Here, God is split into two “parts”: “divinity” (lāhūt), referring to the unknown Creator, and “humanity” (nāsīt), the divine principle created by Him and whose “places of manifestation” (mazāhir) are the prophets and imams. The created nature of God's humanity is what brings this theology closer to Arianism The Divide Between the Divinity (lāhūt) and Humanity (nāsūt) of God  This “two-faced” theology was admirably summarized by the Shi'ite heresiographer Sa'd b. 'Abd Allah al-Qummi (early 10th century), who attributes it to the mukhammisa, the followers of Abu l-Khattab: They claim that the Eternal One (al-wāhid al-azalī) established (aqāma) a single, perfect being (shakhs wāhid kāmil), in whom there is neither growth nor decline. He delegated to him both authority and creation (fawwada ilayhi al-tadbir wa-l-khalq); this being Muhammad, 'Alī, Fatima, al-Hasan, al-Husayn, and the other Imams. Their essence (ma'nā) is one, while their number is merely an illusion. They deny the births [of the Imams] and claim to be incapable of seeking the Eternal One who established this perfect being to whom He delegated [His authority], and who is Muhammad. It is he [Muhammad] who created the heavens and the earth, the mountains, humankind, the jinn, and the world with all that it contains. They claim that it is impossible for them to know the Eternal (al-qadīm al-azalī). Therefore, they are content to know Muhammad, the creator to whom the creation of beings has been delegated (al-khāliq al-mufawwad ilayhi khalq al-khalq). These names by which God is named in His book are, in fact, the names of the delegated creatures. The Eternal created [these creatures], but He created nothing else, so these names do not apply to the Eternal, such as, for example, Allah, the One, the Impervious (al-samad), the Victorious, the Creator, the Living, or the Eternal.³ The God of monotheistic revelations is therefore a God created in the image of man, bearing human attributes and names, and consequently accessible to human perception. The God who, according to the Bible, created Adam "in his image"—a theme absent from the Quran but which nevertheless troubled many a Muslim theologian—is none other than this "human" God, creator and created. The same is true of the visio beatifica, the vision of God by the blessed in paradise; what they will see is the nāsīt, while the lāhūt will remain forever inaccessible to them. It is the nāsīt who will preside over the Last Judgment and, in a broader sense, it is to him that all the anthropomorphisms contained in the image of the Quranic God apply During the early centuries of Islam, this particular theology seems to have been quite widespread in Kufa and the surrounding area, well beyond Shi'ite circles. It is attributed to the two dissident Mu'tazilites, Ibn Habit and Fadl al-Hadathī, already mentioned: They also claim that Christ is the one who will hold creatures accountable in the Hereafter. He is the one to whom God refers in His words: "When your Lord comes, and the angels, rank upon rank" (Qur'an 89:22). He is the one who will come "in the shadow of the clouds" (Qur'an 2:210). He is the one who created Adam in His own image. This is the exegesis (ta'wil) of what is reported, namely, that God created Adam in His image. He [sic, singular] claimed that it is he [Christ] to whom the Prophet alludes when he says: “You will see your Lord as you see the moon on a full moon night.”39 Meanwhile, a traditionist from Kufa who died around 132/750 and is classified by al-Shahrastani among the Sunni Murji'ites, 'Ubayd b. Mihrān al-Muktib, “claimed that God presents Himself in the form ('alā sūra) of a man. He thus explained the [Prophet's] saying: ‘God created Adam in the form of the Most Merciful (al-Rahmān).’”40 Around the same time, the “Neoplatonist” Jahm b. Şafwān defended the absolute transcendence of God, asserting that all His names and attributes are created. The Divine Word is a creature, which the Qur'an designates as al-Rahman: He said: God created a being named al-Rahman. Then He created the Throne and said: "al-Rahman stands majestically upon the Throne" (Qur'an 20:5). This means that this Rahman was created. The doctrine of lāhūt and nāsīt has survived in Ismailism, not without causing persistent confusion among both its opponents and modern scholars. Take, for example, Druzeism, which emerged from Ismailism at the beginning of the 11th century. The Druze are supposed to "divinize" the Fatimid caliph and Ismaili imam al-Hakim (r. 386/996-411/1021), who is considered an "incarnation" of God, the last in our present cycle. In reality, Druze theology is far more complex Thus, she distinguishes within the divinity the lāhūt, forever inaccessible, and the nāsīt, the "human face" of the lāhūt, produced by the latter in ways capable of making contact with creatures. But for this contact to be established, the nāsīt must take on a human appearance (ta'nīs), which it did by assuming the bodily form of al-Hakim. However, the nāsīt is not incarnated in al-Hakim's body, for it is not a physical body, but a simulacrum, a mirage devoid of biological functions. Therefore, according to Hamza b. 'Alī, no one can assert a founders of Druzeism, having seen al-Hakim eat, drink, sweat, urinate, or defecate.42 43 Indeed, Druze doctrine originated from a dissident movement opposed to the Ismaili “orthodoxy” advocated by the Fatimids. But as soon as the latter’s power declined, finally succumbing to Saladin’s attacks (in 567/1171), the theology of lāhūt and nāsīt resurfaced in the Tayyibite Ismailism of Yemen.13 In the meantime, the Fatimids had reformulated it in a less shocking form, drawing on philosophical concepts borrowed from Neoplatonism and falsafa, particularly from al-Fārābī This brings us back to al-Sijistānī and the introduction of his Ithbāt al-nubuwwāt. The unknown God or Founder (mubdi) created ex nihilo, in a single stroke (daf'atan wāhidatan), a unique and perfect being, the "first-founded" (al-mubda' al-awwal), the "Preceding" (al-sābiq) or Universal Intellect (al-'aql al-kulli) - to whom He delegated all His powers and who thus becomes the God of monotheistic religions and "Aristotelian" philosophers like al-Fārābī and Avicenna.44 This is a self-intelligible intellect, whose self-intellection brings about the emanation of the universe, and which, moreover, bears all the names and attributes that the Quran recognizes in God, including the name Allah. In contrast, the Founder takes on the characteristics of the supreme God of the Neoplatonists, the One of Plotinus, devoid of all name and attribute and situated beyond being and nothingness, and even beyond unity and numerical unity. Consequently, everything that the falasifa report concerning the Ultimate Principle must, in reality, be negated from Him and transferred to the first created being, the first Intellect. Al-Sijistani formulates this thesis in a radical way, in a dense passage from his "Book of Sources" (Kitab al-Yanabi): The pure selfhood (al-huwiyya al-mahda) attributed to the Founder, He who is glorified above being Him and not Him (subhanahu 'an huwa wa lā huwa), is in fact only the being of the Predecessor (aysiyyat al-sābiq) arising from the being of the act of foundation (aysiyyat al-ibdā) which befalls Him. This means that the Founder is what the Predecessor knows through His being, of so that the knowledge he has within his being of the One who instituted him is the selfhood of the Instituter. This is not that there is an existing selfhood or a non-existent selfhood apart from what appears to the Predecessor from his own being. For the Instituter is not "him" (lā huwa huwa), like the selfhoods of instituted beings, and he is not "not-him" (lā huwa lā huwa), like the non-selfhoods of beings. Rather, his selfhood is the fact of denying the Instituter that selfhoods and non-selfhoods are glorified [...]. Therefore, refrain from seeking a selfhood beyond the Predecessor after the manifestation of the Predecessor. In other words, the "pure selfhood" that philosophers attribute to the First Principle actually refers to the first created being, the Intellect. The ultimate Creator has no selfhood, just as He has no essence or form. Playing on the double meaning of the word huwiyya (the philosophical notion of selfhood and the fact of being there, of "existing"), al-Sijistānī argues that the huwiyya of the Founder is none other than the Intellect's perception of Him. By thinking of itself, the Intellect realizes that it has been created and therefore that there is a Creator above it But since this is unintelligible, the Intellect knows nothing of this Founder, except that he exists, that he is there, while transcending being and non-being, existence and essence. It follows that the Founder is unknowable and ineffable. God divested himself of everything and gave everything to his only creature, the universal Intellect: Glory to God, who is sanctified beyond the qualities that the act of creation (al-ibdā) brought into existence; who is devoid of signs that fall under the grasp of language and hearing; who transcends, by the abstruseness of his oneness, any representation that would be capable of grasping him; who eludes any attempt to refer to him by definition or qualification. Indeed, he lavishes upon his creation [i.e., the Intellect] all that words can describe and all that imaginations can conceive. But he himself, in his sublimity, remains inaccessible, given the impotence that keeps all creatures below the level required to truly know him. The totality of divine names and attributes therefore refers to the first created being, all the more so since names and attributes belong to language, composed of sounds and letters whose very nature prevents them from designating the transcendent Creator. The Fatimid philosopher Muhammad b. Tahir al-Harithī (d. 584/1188) summarizes the position of the Fatimid philosopher Hamid al-Din al-Kirmānī (d. c. 411/1020) on this matter in these terms: As our master Hamid al-Din says: Since the letters of the alphabet are produced, they can only refer to that which is produced like them. Given this, these names and attributes must be denied to the Most High and Magnanimous. They apply to His establishment (ibdā), which is the first Intellect, the first being, and the first Predecessor (sābiq), while He, glory be to Him, is stripped bare and exalted far above what the unjust and ignorant say. Therefore, the God of the prophets and philosophers is none other than the first created being, the Intellect: Insofar as the Most High is beyond intellect and perception, and, hidden beneath a veil (hijab), is beyond understanding and thought, the paths of inquiry (masālik al-bahth) are cut off below Him. When the need arises to affirm His existence (ithbāt), this can only be done after acquiring the knowledge that everything tongues say about Him and everything lips move about Him, relates to what He created and brought into existence. The mass of ignorant believers, as well as the "exoteric" theologians and philosophers, commit a grave error when they confuse the Creator with His creation: That which is sensible or intelligible can be reached by knowledge. As for God, since He is above the sensible and the intelligible, the gates of perception remain closed. Indeed, if He were sensible, the senses could reach Him; if He were intelligible, He could be grasped by the five paths (al-turuq al-khamsa) [of logic], namely definition (hadd), division (qisma), analysis (tahlil), composition (tarkīb), and demonstration (burhān). Being neither sensible nor intelligible, it is absurd to say of Him what is said of Him.49 The first part of the shahāda, the Islamic profession of faith – “I bear witness that there is no deity except God” (ashhadu anna la ilaha illa Allāhu), the ultimate expression of monotheism – then becomes an attestation of the total inaccessibility of the Founder: I bear witness that divinity is not something (shay) that can be grasped by the intellect or the soul, and about which one can judge by imagination (wahm) or sensations. 50 As an extreme consequence of this logic, even the name Allāh is applied to the first creature. Supposedly derived from the roots aliha and walaha (“to be in awe”), this name would refer to the Intellect's bewilderment at its inability to grasp its Creator. Al-Harithī is perfectly clear on this point: We say "Allah" to express by this name the consternation (walhan) and amazement (tahayyur) of the First Intellect, which is the noblest of all beings. It is said: "He is in awe, troubled by consternation (aliha yalihu min al-walhan) in His magnanimity." 51 Or as an anonymous 19th-century Tayyibite master expresses it: The name al-ilāhiyya belongs only to the first established [i.e., the Intellect]. This name is derived from al-walah, that is, the bewilderment related to the perception of its Founder, and from ulhāniyya, that is, the ardent desire to grasp Him, while incapacity forbids it, because of the majesty of its Founder, who is too exalted to be grasped.132 The dialectic of tawhid, between affirmation and negation The duality of divinity into an unknown God, an uncreated creator, and a revealed God, a created creator, whose origins we have traced to the "extremist" Shi'ite movements of Kufa and followed its theological development in the Ismaili Neoplatonism inevitably raises the question of monotheism in these "heterodox" currents of Islam. How can what might appear as barely disguised polytheism be reconciled with the dogma of tawhid? Or, to return to the question Jad Hatem posed concerning the Druze doctrine unified by unity, muwahhid³? The Ismaili authors developed a complex dialectic of tawhid that culminates in the Tayyibite doctrine. Explaining all the subtleties of this dialectic would require lengthy discussion. For our present purpose, it suffices to outline a few general principles, taking al-Harithī as our guide The central dogma of Islam, the profession of the unity and oneness of God (tawhid), lies at the heart of al-Harithī's major work, the "Book of Subtle Lights" (Kitāb al-Anwār al-latīfa). The world, as we know it today, is the product of the erroneous way in which various protagonists, at different levels, have professed tawhid and continue to do so, while its redemption lies solely in true tawhid. There is only one way to be "unitarian" (muwahhid): through tajrīd, tanzīh, and tathbīt. Through tajrīd ("stripping away"), the unitarian practices, in a sense, negative theology: he strips the Founder of all divine names and attributes Through the acquisition of this knowledge, the entirety of the divine names and attributes that he has stripped from the Founder reverts to him, so that he becomes God, or at least the God of revelations and philosophers, the created God. However, as a creature, he must immediately deny (this is tanzih or negation) his own "divinity" and affirm (tathbit) it as belonging to the ineffable Founder. The originality of the Tayyibit system lies in the fact that this tawhid is repeated at all levels of the universe. It begins with the first Intellect, the first created being, which, by its perfection, bears all the divine names and attributes in the most intense way. By understanding itself, it realizes that it depends on a higher principle, whereupon it denies its own divinity and affirms it as belonging to the Founder He is followed by most of the Cosmic Intellects (there are ten in total, as in al-Fārābī and Avicenna), each of whom, at his level, participates in the divine names and attributes, but denies divinity to himself in order to recognize it in the Founder. The same process applies to the "dignitaries" (hudud) of the Ismaili mission (da wa), from the imam down to the neophyte or Respondent (mustajib). For the latter, at the very bottom of the hierarchy, there is the master who initiates him. In gnosis, God is present, but as one acquires this salvific knowledge, one becomes divine oneself, according to the philosophical definition as ta'alluh, homoiôsis theou. Similarly, for each member of the religious hierarchy, their superior is God, culminating in the divinity of the Imam. But, conversely, this multitude of "created, produced, and established gods" must deny the divinity of themselves and their superiors in order to ultimately affirm it in the Founder. In the absence of this self-negation of divinity, and thus as a result of a mistaken profession of tawhid, evil, imperfection, and darkness appear. This began "in pre-eternity" with the Third Intellect, which refused to acknowledge the precedence of the Second and confused the First Intellect with the unknown Creator. This fatal error caused its fall to the confines of the intelligible world, producing matter and darkness from which our sensible world emerged. The same error is perpetrated by the mass of ahl al-zāhir ("the exotericists"), whether simple believers or renowned theologians and philosophers, who systematically confuse the first creature with the Creator. Their idolatry keeps the majority of humanity in depravity, preventing their souls from detaching themselves from their bodily attachments and returning to their celestial homeland. 55 The "unitarians," from the Cosmic Intellects to the dignitaries of the da'wa, each of whom participates at their own level in the divine attributes and names fully realized in the First Intellect, practice tawhid by professing the absolute unity of the Intellect, a sign of its ultimate perfection, while attesting that its Founder is beyond oneness and number. Through tawhid, the creature recognizes the existence of its Creator and His unity beyond oneness by denying Him all names and attributes and recognizing the metaphorical nature of any discourse about Him. The ignorant mass of believers, theologians, and philosophers, on the other hand, is idolatrous, since it confuses a creature, even one as perfect as the Universal Intellect, with its Creator. Al-Kirmānī expresses this in the following terms: We say that the community [of believers] (umma), by opposing those who possess true guidance [the imams] and neglecting the prescriptions of obedience, will never be able to advance on the path of tawhid to its ultimate point [...]. For this reason, they will invent a being to worship, with the descriptions and conceptions they form about it, whereas this being is nothing other than something included in existence, which falls under creation and whose essence contains the force of establishment (ibda). Since their divinity is created and subject to this force, their tawhid is imperfect because of it, and the garden of paradise remains veiled, as do its delights.  The implications of the texts we have just cited are profound, and the conclusion is inescapable: for the Ismailis, and undoubtedly already for the radical Shiite currents from which they descend, the revealed books of the monotheistic religions—Torah, Gospel, Quran—teach us nothing about God, at least not in the sense generally understood by the followers of these religions. Since all theology, all discourse on God as the ultimate Principle, is by definition impossible, the revealed books speak to us of His creatures, primarily of the Universal Intellect. They are therefore books of metaphysics, describing the first principles of the universe, but whose technical concepts are obscured by symbols and signs As a result, the Ismaili authors developed a unique esoteric exegesis (ta'wil) of the Qur'an in which the God of Islam represents the apparent aspect (zāhir) and the God of the falāsifa the hidden aspect (bātin). But in both cases, the verses interpreted refer to the first creation, and not to the ineffable Founder. Let us conclude with three examples, all taken from al-Kirmānī The Quran repeatedly refers to Allah (including Quran 2:255 and 3:1) as "the Living, the Self-Subsisting" (al-hayy al-qayyūm). For the Ismaili author, it is self-evident that this expression applies to the Intellect and not to the Founder. He explains the verse by the fact that life is the major attribute of the Intellect, a substance in actuality, a pure act whose essence is self-intellection. Now, He adds, pure act is life. While refraining from citing its source, this exposition on life in the Intellect is borrowed from al-Fārābī “The Prophet has believed in what was revealed to him from his Lord. He and the believers have all believed in God and His angels and His Books and His prophets” (Qur'an 2:285). According to al-Kirmānī, “Lord” and “God” refer to the First Intellect, while the angels are the nine Intellects of al-Fārābī’s cosmic system. The hidden meaning of this Qur'anic verse would then relate to the process of emanation whose ultimate source is the First Intellect.59 “God brought you forth from the wombs of your mothers. You knew nothing” (Quran 16:78). Here again, “God” refers to the Intellect. He is the ultimate source of inspiration (ta'yīd) which, transmitted to the prophets and imams through the tenth Intellect, the active Intellect, transforms their intellects from potentiality to actuality. The Quranic verse thus expresses that for humankind, the source of all knowledge is the imam, who in turn receives inspiration from the universal Intellect.160 Our study reveals that for the Ismailis, the God of monotheistic religions and philosophers represents, respectively, the external (zāhir) and internal (bātin) aspects of the first created being, a divinity generated and established by the unknown God who delegated all his prerogatives to him. Our authors constantly reiterate that tawhid does not consist of professing the unity and uniqueness of God alone—that his first creature is one and unique—but rather of stripping him of all forms of multiplicity, including that implied by the notions of "one," "unity," and "unity." True monotheism, then, consists of elevating the Ultimate above the number "one," above unity, and above uniqueness BIBLIOGRAPHY: 1 Sur l'auteur, son oeuvre et sa pensée, voir Paul E. Walker, Abu Ya‘qub al-Sijistani, Intellectual Missionary, Londres - New York, I.B. Tauris, 1996 ; Daniel De Smet, « The Religious Application of Philosophical Ideas », dans Ulrich Rudolph, Rotraud Hansberger et Peter Adamson (éd.), Philosophy in the Islamic World. Volume 1 : 8th — 10th Centuries, Leiden - Boston, Brill, 2017, pp. 735, 744-746, 777-779 (avec bibliographie). 2 Abū Ya‘qūb al-Sijistānī, Ithbāt al-nubuwwāt, éd. Wilferd Madelung et Paul Walker, Téhéran, McGill, 2016, pp. 2-3. 3 La plupart des courants ismaéliens s'accordent sur le fait que l'acte de création ex nihilo (ibdā‘) est le privilège du Dieu inconnu, appelé pour cette raison « l'Instaurateur » (al-Mubdi‘). Or, celui-ci n'a créé que l'Intellect, qui à son tour génère l'univers par émanation (inbi‘āth ou fayḍ) ; voir Paul E. Walker, « The Ismaili Vocabulary of Creation », Studia Islamica 40 (1974), pp. 75-85. 4 Voir à ce sujet les livres classiques de Majid Fakhry, Islamic Occasionalism and its Critique by Averroes and Aquinas, Londres, Allen & Unwin, 1958, Eric L. Ormsby, Theodicy in Islamic Thought. The Dispute over al-Ghazali's “Best of All Possible Worlds”, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984 ; Daniel Gimaret, Théories de l'acte humain en théologie musulmane, Louvain - Paris, Peeters, 1980. 5 Leibniz, Essais de Théodicée (GF 209), Paris, Garnier - Flammarion, 1969, p. 30. 6 Daniel Gimaret, Dieu à l'image de l'homme. Les anthropomorphismes de la Sunna et leur interprétation par les théologiens, Paris, Cerf, 1997. 7 Henry Corbin, Le paradoxe du monothéisme, Paris, L'Herne, 1981. 8 Pour une étude plus élaborée, voir Daniel De Smet, « The City of Kūfa and the Debates about the Delegation of Divine Powers (tafwīḍ) », à paraître dans Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam (2021). 9 Sur les notions de ghuluww et de ghulāt (pluriel de ghālī), voir Mushegh Asatryan, Controversies in Formative Shi‘i Islam. The Ghulat Muslims and their Beliefs, Londres, I. B. Tauris, 2017 ; Daniel De Smet, « Exagération », dans Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi (éd.), Dictionnaire du Coran, Paris, Robert Laffont, 2007, pp. 292-295. 10 Abū Ja‘far al-Ṭūsī, Ikhtiyār ma‘rifat al-rijāl al-ma‘rūf bi-Rijāl al-Kashshī, éd. Ḥasan al-Muṣṭafawī, Mashhad, 1969, n° 547, p. 304 ; cf. Heinz Halm, Die islamische Gnosis. Die extreme Schia und die ‘Alawiten, Zurich - Munich, Artemis Verlag, 1982, p. 59 ; William Tucker, « Bayān b. Sam‘ān and the Bayāniyya : Shī‘ite Extremists of Umayyad Iraq », Muslim World 65 (1975), pp. 248-249 ; Id., Mahdis and Millenarians. Shī‘ite Extremists in Early Muslim Iraq, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 44-45. 11 Sur cette figure emblématique du shi‘isme à Kūfa sous Ja‘far al-Ṣādiq et ses nombreux disciples, les khaṭṭābiyya, voir Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi, « Khaṭṭābiya », Encyclopaedia Iranica, vol. 16/2, 2013, pp. 127-129. 12 Al-Nawbakhtī, Kitāb Firaq al-shī‘a, éd. Hellmut Ritter, Istanbul, Staatsdruckerei, 1931, p. 40 ; cf. Halm, Islamische Gnosis, p. 210. 13 Al-Ṭūsī, Ikhtiyār, n° 588, p. 325. Sur al-Mufaḍḍal voir Asatryan, Controversies, passim. 14 Abū Tammām, Kitāb al-Shajara, éd. Wilferd Madelung et Paul Walker, An Ismaili Heresiography. The “Bāb al-shayṭān” from Abū Tammām's Kitāb al-shajara, Leiden, Brill, 1998, pp. 111 (de la partie arabe). 15 Al-Ash‘arī, Maqālāt al-islāmiyyīn, éd. Hellmut Ritter, Die dogmatischen Lehren der Anhänger des Islam, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner, 1980, p. 8 ; cf. William F. Tucker, « Rebels and Gnostics : al-Muġīra ibn Sa‘īd and the Muġīriyya », Arabica, 22 (1975), pp. 41, 43 ; Id., Mahdis, pp. 62-63. La doctrine selon laquelle « les silhouettes et les ombres » (al-ashbāḥ wa-l-aẓilla) furent créées avant les corps matériels, est très répandue dans les milieux shi‘ites des premiers siècles, en particulier à Kūfa ; voir Asatryan, Controversies, passim ; Daniel De Smet, « Les racines docétistes de l'imamologie shi‘ite », dans Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi e. a. (éd.), L'ésotérisme shi‘ite, ses racines et ses prolongements, Turnhout, Brepols, 2016, pp. 92-95. 16 Pour un aperçu de ces traditions, voir Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi, Le guide divin dans le shî‘isme originel. Aux sources de l'ésotérisme en Islam, Lagrasse, Verdier, pp. 73-95. 17 Al-Ash‘arī, Maqālāt, p. 16. ; cf. al-Baghdādī, al-Farq bayna-l-firaq, Beyrouth, 1987, p. 238. Il va de soi que la distinction entre toutes ces catégories (ṣanf) d' « extrémistes » est un travail d'hérésiographe purement artificiel. En réalité, les doctrines en question sont communes à un ensemble de courants qui, de toute évidence, se confondaient et s'entremêlaient. 18 Selon la tradition, ‘Abd Allāh b. Saba’ serait l' « inventeur » du shi‘isme extrémiste, ayant proclamé la divinité de ‘Alī de son vivant même ; sur cette figure probablement légendaire, voir Halm, Islamische Gnosis, pp. 33-42 ; Sean W. Anthony, The Caliph and the Heretic. Ibn Saba’ and the Origins of Shī‘ism, Leiden - Boston, Brill, 2012. 19 Ibn Bābūya, Risālat al-i‘tiqādāt al-imāmiyya, texte arabe cité par Israel Friedländer, « The Heterodoxies of the Shiites in the Presentation of Ibn Ḥazm », Journal of the American Oriental Society 29 (1908), p. 91. Il y a une allusion manifeste à Cor. 30:40 : « C'est Dieu qui vous a créés. Il vous a ensuite accordé vos moyens de subsistance, puis il vous fera mourir, après quoi il vous fera revivre ». 20 De Smet, « The City of Kūfa ». 21 Daniel De Smet, « Le combat mythique entre le Roi de la Lumière et le Prince des Ténèbres selon le Mani arabe : une lecture islamisée du dualisme ?”, dans Marie-Anne Persoons, Christian Cannuyer, Daniel De Smet (éds.), Les combats dans les mythes et les littératures de l'Orient & Miscellanea orientalia et iranica belgo-polonica. Wojciech Skalmowski in memoriam (Acta Orientalia Belgica 31), Bruxelles 2018, pp. 293-304. 22 Daniel De Smet, « “Le mal ne s'enracine pas dans l'instauration”. La question du mal dans le shi‘isme ismaélien », à paraître dans Oriens. 23 Al-Ash‘arī, Maqālāt, pp. 564-565 ; selon Josef van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra. Geschichte des religiösen Denkens im frühen Islam, 6 vols., Berlin - New York, De Gruyter, 1991-1997, vol. 1, p. 403, Ibn Yāsīn se réfère au karaïte Benjamin al-Nihāwandī. 24 Al-Shahrastānī, Kitāb al-Milal wa-l-niḥal, éd. Muḥammad Kīlānī, Beyrouth, Dār al-ma‘rifa, s.d., vol. 1, pp. 217-218 ; Daniel Gimaret et Guy Monnot, Shahrastani, Livre des religions et des sectes, Louvain - Paris, Peeters, 1986, vol. 1, pp. 606-608. Sur Arius et l'arianisme, voir Henri-Irénée Marrou, L'Église de l'Antiquité tardive, Paris, Seuil, 1985, pp. 36-40 ; Frank L. Cross et Elizabeth Livingstone, The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 100-101. 25 Al-Shahrastānī, Milal, p. 223. 26 Al-Shahrastānī, Milal, p. 227 ; cf. Gimaret et Monnot, Shahrastani, p. 628. 27 Sa‘d b. ‘Abd Allāh al-Qummī, Kitāb al-Maqālāt wa-l-firaq, éd. Jawād Mashkūr, Téhéran, 1963, pp. 47-48 ; al-Ash‘arī, Maqālāt, p. 9 ; cf. William Tucker, « Abū Manṣūr al-‘Ijlī and the Manṣūriyya : a Study in Medieval Terrorism », Der Islam 54 (1977), pp. 66-67, 72, 74 ; Id., Mahdis, pp. 79-80, 83-84. 28 Charles Pellat, « Deux curieux mu‘tazilites : Aḥmad b. Ḥābiṭ et Faḍl al-Ḥadathī », Mélanges de l'Université Saint-Joseph 50 (1984), pp. 483-494. 29 Al-Khayyāṭ, Kitāb al-Intiṣār, éd. H. S. Nyberg, Le livre du triomphe et de la réfutation d'Ibn er- Rawendi l'hérétique, Le Caire 1925, p. 148. 30 Al-Khayyāṭ, Intiṣār, p. 152. 31 Ibn Ḥazm, al-Fiṣal fi l-milal wa-l-ahwā’ wa-l-niḥal, s.d., s.l., vol. 4, p. 150. 32 Al-Baghdādī, Farq, p. 260. Je suis ici l'émendation proposée par van Ess, Theologie, vol. 6, p. 217 note 21. Le texte imprimé a ‘alā ma‘nā al-nabī (« dans le sens du prophète »), ce qui manifestement n'a pas de sens. 33 Corbin, Paradoxe, pp. 67-70, 113-114. 34 De Smet, « Racines docétistes », pp. 87-112. 35 Henry Corbin, « Épiphanie divine et naissance spirituelle dans la gnose ismaélienne », Eranos Jahrbuch 23 (1954), pp. 144-152, 193-210 ; cf. Simon Mimouni, « La doctrine du Verus Propheta de la littérature pseudo-clémentine chez Henry Corbin et ses élèves », dans Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi, Christian Jambet, Pierre Lory (éd.), Henry Corbin. Philosophies et sagesses des religions du livre, Turnhout, Brepols, 2005, pp. 165-175 ; De Smet, « Racines docétistes », pp. 109-112. 36 Roger Arnaldez, « Lāhūt et nāsūt », Encyclopédie de l'islam. Deuxième édition, vol. 5, Leiden, Brill, 1986, pp. 615-618. 37 Aussi ne peut-Il être l'objet d'aucune expérience mystique, de quelque nature qu'elle soit ; voir Daniel De Smet, « Le mystère des mystères est inaccessible à l'engagement du coeur et à la perception de l'intellect. Néoplatonisme et (anti)mysticisme dans la pensée ismaélienne », dans Danielle Cohen- Levinas, Géraldine Roux et Meryem Sebti (éd.), Mystique et philosophie dans les trois monothéismes, Paris, Hermann, 2015, pp. 67-87. 38 Al-Qummī, Maqālāt, p. 61 ; cf. Halm, Islamische Gnosis, pp. 230-232. Les mukhammisa (« ceux qui multiplient par cinq ») doivent leur nom au fait que, selon eux, la première créature, le nāsūt Muhammad, se déploie dans les cinq personnes des ahl al-bayt, qui toutefois ne forment qu'une seule et unique personne. Il s'agit là d'une variante de la doctrine que nous décrivons en ces pages. 39 Al-Baghdādī, Farq, pp. 260-261. 40 Al-Shahrastānī, Milal, pp. 140-141 ; cf. Gimaret et Monnot, Shahrastani, p. 422 n. 29 ; van Ess, Theologie, vol. 1, p. 213. La même doctrine est attribuée aux nābita (un terme flou désignant des courants anthropomorphistes au sein du sunnisme) : « Ils prétendent que Dieu a créé Adam selon la forme du Miséricordieux (al-Raḥmān) (Abū Tammām, Shajara, p. 62 du texte arabe, 64 de la trad.). 41 Jamāl al-Dīn al-Murtaḍā al-Rāzī, Tabṣirat al-‘awāmm, éd. ‘Abbās Iqbāl, Téhéran, 1934, p. 56 ; cf. van Ess, Theologie, vol. 2, p. 500, vol. 5, p. 218 ; Richard Frank, « The Neoplatonism of Ǧahm ibn Ṣafwān », Le Muséon 78 (1965), pp. 420-422. 42 Daniel De Smet, Les Épîtres sacrées des Druzes, Louvain, Peeters, 2007, pp. 39-42 ; Id., « Racines docétistes », p. 108. 43 Daniel De Smet, « The Intellectual Interactions of Yemeni Ṭayyibism with the Early Shi‘i Tradition », dans Orkhan Mir-Kasimov (éd.), Intellectual Interactions in the Islamic World. The Ismaili Thread, Londres, I.B. Tauris, 2020, pp. 314-318. 44 Daniel De Smet, « Al-Fārābī's Influence on Ḥamīd al-Dīn al-Kirmānī's Theory of Intellect and Soul », dans Peter Adamson (éd.), In the Age of al-Fārābī: Arabic Philosophy in the Fourth/Tenth Century, Londres - Turin, The Warburg Institute - Nino Aragno, 2008, pp. 134-141. 45 Abū Ya‘qūb al-Sijistānī, Kitāb al-Yanābī‘, éd. Henry Corbin, Trilogie ismaélienne, Téhéran - Paris, Institut franco-iranien - Adrien Maisonneuve, 1961, § 22-24, pp. 15-16 (de la partie arabe) ; cf. Henry Corbin, Trilogie ismaélienne, Lagrasse, Verdier, 1994, pp. 44-45 ; Paul E. Walker, The Wellsprings of Wisdom, Salt Lake City, The University of Utah Press, 1994, pp. 49-50. 46 Al-Sijistānī, Yanābī‘, § 1, p. 2 (de la partie arabe) ; cf. Corbin, Trilogie, p. 19 ; Walker, Wellsprings, p. 39. 47 Muḥammad b. Ṭāhir al-Ḥārithī, Kitāb al-Anwār al-laṭīfa, éd. Ḥussām Khuḍūr, Salamiyya, Dār al- Ghadīr, 2011, p. 40 ; cf. Ḥamīd al-Dīn al-Kirmānī, Kitāb Rāḥat al-‘aql, éd. Muṣṭafā Ghālib, Beyrouth, Dār al-Andalus, 1983, p. 145. 48 Ḥamīd al-Dīn al-Kirmānī, Kitāb al-Riyāḍ, éd. ‘Ārif Tāmir, Beyrouth, Dār al-Thaqāfa, 1960, p. 218. 49 Al-Kirmānī, Rāḥat al-‘aql, p. 137. 50 Ḥamīd al-Dīn al-Kirmānī, al-Risāla al-Durriyya fī ma‘nā al-tawḥīd wa-l-muwaḥḥid, éd. Muṣṭafā Ghālib, Majmū‘at rasā’il al-Kirmānī, Beyrouth, al-Mu’assasa al-jāmi‘iyya lil-dirāsāt wa-l-nashr wa-ltawzī‘, 1987, p. 19. 51 Al-Ḥārithī, Anwār, pp. 40-41. 52 Rudolph Strothmann, Gnosis-Texte der Ismailiten, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1943, p. 80 ; cf. Daniel De Smet, La Quiétude de l'Intellect. Néoplatonisme et gnose ismaélienne dans l'oeuvre de Ḥamīd al-Dīn al-Kirmānī, Louvain, Peeters, 1995, pp. 176-180. 53 Jad Hatem, Dieu en guise d'homme dans le druzisme, Paris, Librairie de l'Orient, 2006, pp. 68-80. 54 Al-Ḥārithī, Anwār, pp. 41, 44-55. Le passage sur les « Dieux créés, produits et instaurés » se lit p. 44. 55 Sur ce « drame dans le ciel », voir Daniel De Smet, La philosophie ismaélienne, Paris, Cerf, 2012, pp. 82-88. 56 Les textes ismaéliens relatifs au tawḥīd se basent généralement sur la distinction (néo)pythagoricienne entre l'un numérique, qui correspond au premier Intellect, et l'un au-delà du nombre qui s'appliquerait à l'Instaurateur ; voir Daniel De Smet, « Pythagoras’ Philosophy of Unity as a Precursor of Islamic Monotheism : Pseudo-Ammonius and Related Sources », à paraître dans Irène Caiazzo, Constantinos Macris et Aurélien Robert (éd.), Brill's Companion to the Reception of Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. 57 Al-Kirmānī, Durriyya, pp. 25-26 ; cf. De Smet, Quiétude, p. 89. 58 Al-Kirmānī, Rāḥat al-‘aql, pp. 189-190 ; cf. De Smet, « Al-Fārābī's Influence », pp. 137, 140 ; Id. Quiétude, p. 164. 59 Al-Kirmānī, Rāḥat al-‘aql, p. 262. 60 Al-Kirmānī, Rāḥat al-‘aql, pp. 451-452. |
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